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Abstract
An assessment of the consequences of biological invasions and of the
measures taken against must be at the base of each social decision in this field.
Three forms of uncertainty can be distinguished that make such a decision
difficult to take: (1) factual uncertainty, which encompasses not only risk, but
also unknown probabilities of known consequences, and unknown
consequences, (2) individual uncertainty, i.e. insecurity about the values to
consider, and about the form how to consider them, and (3) social actor
uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about the social actors to consider and how to do it.
This paper furnishes axiomatic reflections about the difficulties of assessments
integrating these three uncertainties. Using this analytical separation, it
restructures two main assessment techniques, and herewith shows the main
differences between cost-benefit-analysis and multi-criteria decision aid in
supporting public decisions about biological invasions. It is shown that the main
difference between cost-benefit-analysis, the classical economic decision
support, and multi-criteria decision analysis is less its mono- vs. multi-criteria
approach, but its facility to be embedded in a social decision context. With multi-
criteria decision aid it is more facile to lay open the uncertainties in all three
dimensions and to make them an explicit topic for public discourse. Therefore, it
seems more suitable as an assessment method for biological invasions.
Keywords: Biodiversity, Multi-criteria analysis, Uncertainty, Integrated
Assessment, Biological Invasion, Cost-benefit analysis2
1. Introduction
Plants and animals have been transported by human agents since long ago.
The consequences of these transports attracted wide attention through large
devastating effects on human environments. The first kind of environment
affected by invasive species have been agricultural systems: Production
systems in monoculture are fragile, and alien species have large effects easily.
It is rather easy to determine the effects biological invasions have on
agriculture: Agricultural goods are marketable goods and losses of goods are
priced accordingly. Throughout this paper, biological invasions that threaten
agriculture, forestry or fishery are regarded only as a part of the more general
problem. The biological and social discussion about neobiota is more
concerned by the effects those plants and animals have on natural or semi-
natural ecosystems or on parts of these. The effects might be on biodiversity,
but also on water availability, biochemical circles, aesthetics, or on human
safety and health. It is more difficult to determine the impact biological invasions
in general have on ecosystems (Parker et al. 1999), and – via ecosystems – on
social and economic activities than just on agriculture.
The impact of an invading species depends on its host ecosystem. In some
ecosystems, certain species do not appear as invasions, but establish
themselves alongside native species whereas they are invasive in other
ecosystems. There have been attempts to identify specific attributes of invasive
species (cp. for plants in UK  Thompson et al., 1995, Crawley et al., 1996,
Williamson and Fitter, 1996, Prinzing et al., 2002), but these types of analyses
have a rather low prognostic power for other species ( Lewin, 1987,  Gilpin,
1990). Furthermore, most species invade with a certain time lag, due for
example to climatic adaptation (Kowarik, 1992, 1995). It is difficult to predict this
time lag.
There are large differences in scientific opinion concerning the number of
potentially invasive species. A fairly known rule of thumb is the “ten’s rule”
(Williamson, 1996): If you introduce 100 species into new ecosystems, then
(always approximately) 10 will establish self-sustaining populations, and 1
species will be regarded as a pest, as a biological invasion. For example,
Rapoport (1991) regards 10 % of all  260.000 vascular plants species as
potentially invasive. Only 4.000 of these 26.000 species have been introduced
in other parts of the world up to now. Even if Rapoports estimation would be3
50 % too high, and if only 10 % of the potentially invading species cause large
damage, then there are still some 1.000 invasive species causing large damage
and waiting for transport (Reichard and White, 2001). Mark Williamson (1999:
10) even states that “it could be that invasions are unpredictable in the way that
earthquakes are”, i.e. individually unpredictable.  Vitousek et al. (1996)
distinguish four different consequences of invasions: Damage to human health,
damage to human wealth, alteration of ecosystem processes, and reduction of
biological diversity.
Social actors have to decide how to handle the problem of biological invasions.
Measures may be taken concerning 1) the import of foreign species, 2) their
introduction into nature, 3) their establishment, and 4) their invasion. Measures
on one stage may include measures on other stages: society may want to
hinder further importation of an already established species, for example, and
fight the established plants or animals at the same time. Rational decisions
demand an assessment for the impacts of the decisions which should be as
complete as possible. The assessment process which should be at the base of
the decision may be divided into three steps. 
1
•  A first step is to specify the underlying physical effects of invasions and of
measures against invasions
2.
•  The second step is the individual evaluation of the impacts of invasions on
the social and economic environment of humans.
•  In a third step, different individual evaluations have to be aggregated in
order to reach a general decision.
Even if these three steps are intertwined in practice, it is nevertheless important
to distinct them analytically. In the following, the main difficulties of these three
steps will be highlighted and linked to three different types of uncertainty. It will
become clear that social decision making in the field of biological invasions is a
complex task.
Assessments of measures concerning biological invasions may use different
techniques. The following questions concerning science, ethics, technique and
institutions are relevant touchstones in order to decide which assessment
technique is useful in which case. The questions will be deduced from a
discussion of different dimensions of uncertainty that are at stake in the field of
                                                
1 Cp. the description of  invasive processes in Richardson et al. (2000).
2 It is clear that the assessment of an existing biological invasion without any measure taken actively
against is just the same as the assessment of the measure “do nothing”. In the following, assessment of
invasions or assessment of measures against invasions will be used interchangeably.4
social decisions on biological invasions. Answers will be given in the last section
of the paper.
•  Is the knowledge base reflected adequately by the assessment technique?
•  Is the use of the technique consistent with the moral base of the society?
•  Is the technique a useful base within the existent institutional conditions?
•  Are the yardsticks used a good measure of the overall aim?
Uncertainty in the field of biological invasions will be the topic of the next
chapter in a factual, individual, and social dimension. An integrated
assessment, opposed to a partial assessment, will have to consider these three
dimensions
3. The third chapter describes main principles of cost-benefit-
analysis as the classical economic analysis and some applications to the
problem of biological invasions. The content of the fourth chapter is the multi
criteria decision aid as a form of an integrated assessment. In answering the
touchstone questions, the concluding fifth chapter gives an exploratory
evaluation of which assessment technique – or combination of techniques –
might prove useful for the evaluation of measures against biological invasions.
2. Three Dimensions of Uncertainty
Decision makers in the field of biological invasions are confronted with three
different dimensions of uncertainty:
•  factual uncertainty about the predicted factual consequences of the decision,
•  individual uncertainty about the relative importance of the different problem
dimensions, and
•  social actor uncertainty about the selection of and the importance given to
decision actors to be considered.
4
In this chapter, these three dimensions of uncertainty are analysed succinctly
and related to the problem of the assessment of biological invasions. Each one
of these uncertainties can be related to a step in the assessment process. Such
an assignment makes sense analytically – in real processes, there are
interdependencies. The analysis of the three types of uncertainty constitutes the
background against which the appropriateness of different assessment
techniques can be evaluated.
                                                
3 See Rotmans and van Asselt, 2002, for an extensive discussion about different practices of  integrated
assessment.
4 Social actor uncertainty as defined here, is a short form of individual uncertainty concerning the social
actors to be considered. Nevertheless, it will be separated here.5
2.1 Factual uncertainty
Factual uncertainty relates mainly to the first step of the assessment process,
i.e. the specification of the physical effects of an invasion.
As said before, it is difficult to predict the time lag a species needs to establish
itself or – after its establishment – to invade a foreign ecosystem. It is very
difficult to predict the “success” of a species to get established, or to become a
pest. It is also difficult to predict the effects of a species on an ecosystem once
it has become a pest. In the language of decision theory: the probability of such
an event (establishment after introduction or invasion after establishment) is
approx. 10 % (cp. “ten’s rule”, cited above), and the outcome of the event is
unknown. This is, still in the language of decision theory, not just a case of risk,
where potential outcomes of a decision and their probabilities are known, but it
is a case of uncertainty, where it is impossible to calculate the expected value.
Furthermore, there is still a lot of ignorance on this issue
5: Who could have
imagined, for example, the Great Mullein  (Verbascum thapsus) originated in
moderated zones of Eurasia, to invade tropical mountains such as happened in
the islands of Réunion or Hawaii ( Kloetzli 1994)? And who did imagine the
impact of Australian tree species  Acacia, Eucalyptus  and Hakea growing in
South Africa on local water cycles (Van Wilgen et al. 2001)? Probabilities of
events, such as introduction, and even more establishment or invasion of a new
plant or animal are unknown as well as the potential outcome of such an event.
Going more into detail of the risk aspect, one notices that (1) the probabilities of
the single species to establish or invade vary to a large extent; there are – at
least in moderated or arctic regions – a lot of species for which the risk of
establishment is nearly zero due to frost in winter, (2) there are some species,
normally unknown, with the potential outcomes close to a catastrophe (up to
now, there is less evidence for terrestrial regions in continental Europe, but
there is high evidence for tropical islands or marine or estuarine systems
6). It is
clearly rational not to take drastic measures concerning species with nearly no
probability of establishment, and it is also rational to take measures which
inhibit catastrophes. Risk-based assessment of biological invasions makes only
sense in cases where the risk, i.e. the probabilities of the outcomes, can be
calculated. This is the case for invasions which take place already (see on risk
assessment for biological invasions: Shogren, 2000 and Smith et al., 1999). It is
                                                
5 Look at Faber and Proops 1998 for a more specific treatment of ignorance, risk, and uncertainty.
6 Compare Lonsdale 1999 on global patterns of plant invasions.6
almost impossible to stop an invasion which is going on, and, generally, it is
very costly to slow its extension (Sharov and Liebhold, 1998).
Going more into detail of the uncertainty and ignorance aspect, one notices that
it has not been possible to make general statistics concerning the invasion
probability dependent on any variables. We are not in a position to isolate
reasonable hypotheses concerning the real probability of a certain species to
get established or to become a pest. We only have the ten’s rule concerning all
species together. Consequently, as we do not know whether a species will be
the invading one or one of the 999 that might be imported without a great harm,
we are not able to calculate expected values of measures. Therefore, is rational
to choose the measure with the smallest potential negative effects.
This does not necessarily mean to carry out the most draconian measures
against biological invasions: the most draconian and most effective method
against invasions for an island would be its complete isolation from the traffic of
goods and persons. But isolation will certainly be judged catastrophically in our
societies for social and economic reasons. Consequently, such a measure has
to be avoided, too.
It is difficult to give further general rules on how to deal with factual uncertainty
(cp.  Hübner, 2001, Arrow and Hurwicz, 1972, Wald, 1950). But assessment
techniques must supply an appropriate way of dealing with factual uncertainty
without limiting the considerations to the risk aspect only in reinterpreting
uncertainty and ignorance as risk or in leaving these aspects without
consideration.
2.2 Individual uncertainty
Individual uncertainty relates mainly to the second step of the assessment
process, i.e. the individual evaluation of the physical impacts on the economic
and social sphere.
What is special about biological invasions compared to buying a loaf of bread,
for example? In the first case, the decision maker
7 is confronted with a decision
that will have implications for many moral entities (humans, non-humans,
existing and not yet existing) and for many aspects of human and non-human
life, some of them irreversible. Therefore, different questions have to be
                                                
7 The decision maker may be an individual or a group. The female singular is used in this paper for
reasons of simplicity only.7
answered before being able to decide whether a decision is a “good” decision or
not:
•  Do only humans count? If yes:
•  Do only existing humans count? If yes:
•  Do only persons
8 count? If yes:
•  Do persons always know best what is good for them?
If the decision maker says „no“ to one of the first three questions, then she has
to integrate the „good“ of entities into her decision who/which are not able to
express them on their own. The issue of how this may be done will partly be
discussed in the third point of this chapter: Social actor uncertainty. This
paragraph will first focus on the last question which is already difficult enough,
and then consider the first three questions.
If persons know best themselves what is good for them, the decision maker just
has to ask them and may consider this in her decision
9. Here are different ways
how to ask the persons concerned and how to aggregate the answers. I offer
three perspectives which are far from being fully representative for all
perspectives one may take reasonably.
1.  Utilitarianism as a very influential monistic ethics states that the “good” is
mono-dimensional, and that all kinds of utility and  dis-utility may be
aggregated inside each of us. Therefore, each of us would be able to
calculate his resulting positive or negative utility out of a measure and to
express it in monetary or other terms.
2.  Other ethics, e.g. Aristotelian ethics (e.g. O'Neill, 1993, 2001), start from a
multi-dimensionality of the personal “good”. In other words, there is no
(complete) substitutability of the different dimensions, and each dimension
has to be considered separately. Only reflecting on the different effects of a
decision in the different dimensions may result in a good decision without an
ethically founded possibility to enounce a worth that this decision would
constitute to the person. Here, even if the decision maker is convinced of a
                                                
8 In the current philosophical debate, necessary conditions for a person are i.a.: Self-awareness, capability
of epistemic differentiation, emotive expression, communication, education, temporal awareness, and
emotional and social relations with other persons.
9 I do not treat the question how the good of other persons will be included in the decision. Here, it is
neither assumed that the decision maker is a benevolent dictator nor that she is an egoist, but it is assumed
that the interests of others which are motivated by their quest of the good, is relevant for the decision in
one or another way. But it is intended to provide for an assessment technique that assists benevolent
decision makers.8
“yes” to all four questions asked at the beginning of this sub-section, this
does not mean that she knows what to do with the different perceptions of
“good”. Any assessment technique would have to be open to different
conceptions of “good”.
3.  Some authors ( Sen, 1987, 1995: 23 pp.,  Sagoff, 1988a,  Norton, 2002)
believe that there are differences between the preferences of individuals and
the preferences for a community. The latter preferences are less revealed
through private, but more through common acts. If both preferences are of
any relevance to the decision maker, then assessment techniques must be
open to group discourse as well as to individual answering.
Some authors (cp. the discussion in economics about merit goods, e.g. Ver
Eecke 2002)  challenge that persons do know best what is good for them.
Especially when dealing with complex systems and high uncertainty, lay-
persons may not be able to distinguish what is really good for them. Even if one
might challenge this opinion on theoretical grounds, it is still highly plausible for
practical reasons. Therefore, scientific expertise should enter the assessment
directly, and not only via an additional information of concerned lay-persons
which they use for an altered evaluation of the situations.
For most philosophers, it is clear that non-person humans have the right that
their interests are respected by the persons whose acts have impacts on them.
For many philosophers, this is still true for non-human beings which suffer from
our decisions in a way that is somehow similar to human suffering (prominently:
Singer, 1993). For some philosophers, this is still so for entities which cannot
suffer, i.e. “lower” animals, plants or even processes (e.g. Callicott, 1980). I will
not go into detail and take a stand, but conclude two consequences from the
discussion of environmental ethics: (1) There is a great diversity of arguments,
and the decision maker may feel insecure about the arguments to follow, and
(2), if the third question of the list above is negated, then she has to search for a
way on how to integrate interests of those who/which are living non-persons.
It is the “no” to the second question that constitutes generally the greatest
motivation to an attitude and to acts that respect the environment. Many actors
protect the natural environment because they accept the right of future human
generations to fulfil their needs. This right of other generations is difficult to
concretise in detail, but it is clear that having a sufficient natural resource base
is a part of it – this right incorporated in the concept of sustainable development
is widely acknowledged. Measures without irreversible negative consequences9
on the natural resource base are therefore, ceteris paribus, to be preferred to
measures with negative consequences.
Taking decisions about biological invasions means to take decisions (1) where
many entities are concerned by a decision, (2) where it is not sure who these
entities are, (3) where the decision touches upon many aspects of life, and (4)
where irreversible consequences are to be expected. All these aspects
contribute to the individual value uncertainty of the decision maker. Due to this
type of uncertainty, any assessment method must be open to different ethical
conceptions, open to integrate non-persons as well as to respect the right of
future generations. A narrow basis of the assessment method which allows only
to consider certain of these individual moral aspects, i.e. for example a limitation
to a monistic consideration of individual evaluations of living persons, would be
fatal for a full consideration of individual and social values that go well beyond
this aspect.
2.3 Social actor uncertainty
In an assessment process, it is not sufficient to consider individual and social
values, even if these are considered in their full range. The decision maker has
to decide on how to aggregate these evaluations. Here, two aspects of this
social actor uncertainty can be distinguished: Whom to consider and how to
consider. Aggregation can be done using an algorithm which counts all different
evaluations available, considering the valuing entities equally or to different
extents. On the other side of the scale of aggregation methods is a discursive
process with a decision based on arguments rather than on numbers. Before
using either aggregation method on this scale, the decision maker has to know,
though, whom to consider. Apart from the individual moral uncertainty
considered above, this is even a problem when only living persons are
considered. If it is not clear who are the persons concerned, it is much more
difficult to use only algorithmic procedures, whereas in discursive procedures, a
representativeness of the discoursing persons might be easier to identify (cp. on
the problems of the concept of representativeness O’Neill 2001).
Before a biological invasion takes place, it is often impossible to tell who will be
concerned by this invasion. It is much easier to tell who might be concerned by
active measures against an invasion. Experience has shown that in many fields,
decisions are more efficient and implemented more effectively if they are based
on a consensus or quasi-consensus of the actors concerned. This is even more10
valid in fields touching on nature conservation in semi-natural or cultural
habitats. Apart from this functional argument that speaks in favour of
participatory decision making, there are ethical-normative arguments which will
not be considered here (see on this Webler and Renn, 1995). Once an invasion
has taken place, it becomes rather clear who is concerned by it, even if the
further impacts of the invasion are partly uncertain. In decisions on the stages
before, i.e. on import, introduction or establishment, it is less obvious who is
concerned. Therefore, decision processes at these stages have to be open to a
large array of stakeholders.
Furthermore, the aspects of individual value uncertainty discussed above call
for participation of persons and for participation of an advocate for non-persons
or non-living persons.
In the following two chapters, two assessment methods, cost-benefit-analysis
and multi- criteria decision aid are presented and discussed, especially
concerning their integration of the three dimensions of uncertainty.
3. Classical Economic Assessment
The classical economic approach for the assessment and evaluation of a
measure is to calculate the Total Economic Value (TEV) using a cost-benefit-
analysis (CBA) of the consequences of this action. Cost-benefit-analysis, being
the classical economic assessment and evaluation method, is based on one
main methodological assumption. This main assumption of most economists
and many other social scientists is methodological individualism herewith
referring any valuation to concerned individuals only. Costs and benefits are
assessed by and with respect to the individuals concerned by the measure, and
not by scientists or with respect to holistic entities such as state, nature,
humanity, etc.
The application of CBA to environmental fields has grown ever more in the last
decades and years
10. Here, it became more and more apparent that costs and
benefits are not only costs and benefits that are exchanged on markets and
therefore “naturally” expressed in monetary terms, but all kinds of pain and
pleasure, as J. Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, called it. This is practised
through the following proceeding: To calculate the TEV of a measure, one has
                                                
10 Compare for example: Hampicke, 1991; Hampicke et al., 1991; Perrings et al., 1992; Swanson and
Barbier, 1992; Kopp and Smith, 1993; Spash and Hanley, 1995; Perrings and Opschoor, 1994; Perrings,
1995; Smith, 1996; Garrod and Willis, 1999.11
to integrate different kinds of values: use values and non-use values. The
former comprise benefits and costs for the concerned individuals arising in
direct and indirect actual or later use (which would be hindered or furthered by
that measure). Non-use values on the other hand, are not caused by using
some goods altered by the measure: existence values denote values that
individuals give to a good only because it exists, altruistic and bequest values
are designated to goods because of their potential or actual use or non-use
values for others. The ideal classical economic valuation via a CBA considers
the monetary evaluations of all effects a measure has on individuals aggregated
over time, space, and persons. The aggregated value, the TEV, may then be
compared to the TEV’s of concurring measures
11.
Cost-benefit-analysis integrates the different aspects of the evaluation with the
help of the revealed preferences of the individuals in using market prices for
market goods and pseudo market prices for non-market goods. These pseudo
market prices are calculated using functional equivalents for the altered natural
functions or using prices that are given by respondents to questionnaires
constructing a hypothetical market (this method is called contingent valuation
method and is the mostly used method in economic environmental
assessment). In this latter case, integration of different aspects happens within
the heads of isolated individuals. All individual valuations of all aspects are then
integrated on a monetary scale. Therefore, these values do not only cover costs
of agriculture, forestry and other economic sectors, but also, for example,
monetarised expressions of individual concern about the endangerment of
species.
Whenever following the three steps of the procedure, i.e. specify physical
effects, individual evaluation and aggregation of evaluations, in order to assess
the impacts of biological invasions or of measures taken against invasions
economically, one has to know the specific impacts of an invasion (or of the
measures) on the ecological system, on individuals, and finally, one has to
aggregate them. The knowledge of the ecological impacts implies that all
ecological impacts such as impacts on biochemical cycles, world-wide
homogenisation, replacement or extinction of indigenous species, altered
species spectrum, different succession, etc. has to be known. Furthermore, it
                                                
11 Such a comparison of interpersonally aggregated valuations is, strictly speaking, not compatible with
the combination of two main assumptions of economics, i.e. methodological individualism and ordinal
utility, as the gains and losses do not have the same distribution in all compared measures.12
has to be clear which impacts these ecological changes have on the individuals,
directly or via social changes. These impacts are then evaluated by the
concerned persons themselves. The aggregation is done by summing up the
individual monetary evaluations.
By comparing the TEV of different measures of control or prevention,
economists are able to propose efficient measures which further most the well-
being of the concerned individuals. Up to now, though, no complete evaluations
of measures in the context of biological invasions have been made. (Cp.
Pimentel et al. 2001 for an overview of existing economic appraisals of the
invasion of specific species in specific areas, or Wilgen et al., 2001 for South
Africa). The great majority of studies is centred around use values, i.e. the
narrow economical effects of invasions  resp. measures against them on
agriculture, forestry, fishery, etc.  For example,  Barbier (2001) uses a two
species model with limited interactions between the two species in order to
calculate the loss of direct use of the endemic species due to the invasion.
Pimentel et al. (2001) calculate a damage of at least US$ 314 billion per year in
United States, United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa, India, and Brazil. 248
billion $ are due to crop, pasture, and forest losses. The greatest part of the
resulting costs are losses in fishery, power production, or due to control
activities. It is evident that there is still a long way to go to a methodologically
sound complete economic evaluation of a biological invasion let alone of the
sum of different biological invasions in one country or region.
The main source concerning the economics of biological invasions is the book
with the same name of  Perrings et al. (2000). The authors see a strong
necessity for further case studies in this new field of economic research.
Shogren et al. (1999) state three main reasons why economics matters for
endangered species protection: human economic behaviour determines the
degree of risk to a species, the costs of any measure protecting species must
be taken into consideration, and economic incentives are critical in shaping
human behaviour.
The next three chapters show how cost-benefit- analysis copes with the three
dimensions of uncertainty.13
3.1 Factual uncertainty
Assessment techniques must supply an appropriate way for integrating
uncertainty.
1.  An explicit way to consider uncertainty in CBA is to consider only those
impacts that can be assessed clearly, and to take the lowest estimation of
environmental damages in order not to overestimate the damages (Cp. for
example Costanza et al., 1998). This practice of conservative estimation is
in opposition to rational precautionary principles in cases of great
uncertainty.
2.  According to methodological subjectivism, only the concerned persons
evaluate the consequences of a decision. The probabilities used in
economic assessments are not objective, but subjective, and may be very
vague. The problem of lay-person evaluation is enhanced by using their own
subjective probabilities. Assessing and evaluating complex processes in
complex systems may go well beyond the intellectual capacities of lay-
persons, especially if these evaluations are done individually without
possibilities of interactive communication. Even if the ecological
consequences of measures against invasions would be known exactly, it
would still be quite difficult to monetarise these consequences sensibly.
Misconceptions or misinterpretations are unreproducible and thus
incorrigible in contingent valuation studies.
Consequently, ignorance and uncertainty can not be addressed by evaluating
physical or social effects with the help of monetary values (cp. O’Connor 2002).
One way to account for ignorance would be to add some politically defined
value to the costs or benefits, but it would prove difficult to find a
methodologically sound reasoning for this proceeding.
3.2 Individual uncertainty
Due to this type of uncertainty, any assessment method must be open to
different ethical conceptions, be it a multi-dimensional view of the “good”, open
to integrate non-persons, and to respect the right of future generations.
CBA is open only to a mono-dimensional view of the “good”. Other views enter
the calculus only by means of their expression and interpretation as monistic
values (Sagoff, 1988b, calls this a categorical mistake). The trade-offs between
different dimensions are partly explicit, partly – in contingent valuation – implicit.14
The assumption of an overall substitutability of all effects may only be
abandoned with the help of ad-hoc decisions on threshold values which do not
really fit into the methodological frame. Irreversibility is not considered as a
special topic. Non-persons or future persons are considered only via the
amount of money contemporary individuals want to pay so that the former can
use (or non-use) the evaluated good. The „good“ of future persons is
furthermore considered via the integration of future evaluations. Mostly, the
length such a consideration does not exceed 20 years, and if it does, the
discounted evaluations are close to zero. This means, that, in practice, future
generations do not count.
3.3 Social actor uncertainty
CBA is by itself a decision making process which takes into account the
interests of all concerned persons (or less than all, as this is not practicable). It
does so in an individualised way, using market values that are created by an
atomised process, or asking persons separately and only with the possibility of
giving monetary values. The TEV can be integrated into a social decision
making process insofar as it can be one of several decision bases (this goes
against its theoretical integrative reasoning based on utilitarianism). When it is
combined with social or environmental assessments, then it dominates them in
practice because of its apparent accuracy. It is questionable whether the TEV is
well suited as a base for an open and fair discourse, or for the explicit inclusion
of advocates for non-persons.
Critics arise, in conclusion, against CBA for several reasons:
12
•  irreversibility and uncertainty are difficult to handle,
•  monetarisation may not yield a good measure of the moral “good”,
•  there are doubts concerning the assumed overall substitutability of all
different values linked to biological invasions and their consequences, and
•  scepticism is expressed about the practical utility of a classical CBA for
many decision processes.
Nevertheless, not to make an economic appraisal of a biological invasion may
lead to an underestimation of its negative effects and, therefore, to a policy of
laissez faire which does not take measures that might prove sensible.
                                                
12 Cp. also Munda 1996.15
It will be examined whether multi-criteria decision aid as a form of an integrated
assessment can overcome these four main difficulties without losing theoretical
foundations. The embedding of a multi-dimensional evaluation method into a
well structured decision process might be a way towards a decision aid that –
without losing the social force of economic arguments – does more justice to
expert knowledge from natural sciences and to non-economical values of
individuals. In the next chapter, such an integrated assessment will be
described and analysed on its ability to handle the difficulties of irreversibility
and uncertainty.
4. Multi-criteria decision aid
Mono-criterion assessments which do not integrate all aspects of a problem
may be part of a multi criteria decision aid (MCDA). This method includes only
parts of a complete CBA and evaluates other impacts on non-monetary scales.
These might be measures of natural scientists or qualitative evaluations of
experts or of lay-persons. This can be especially important in cases of high
uncertainty that are emblematic for cases of biological invasions  (Drechsler,
2001).
In order to assess the physical, but also other impacts of invasions as the first
step of an MCDA process, different criteria are identified or constructed that
give a complete picture of the relevant problem aspects. These criteria are not
integrated into one yardstick by the calculation of trade-offs, but remain
separated. The different measures are then assessed on each of the criteria
separately, yielding an impact matrix. The following step, i.e. evaluating the
effects and aggregating them individually, is twofold and explicit: (a) The
decision maker state preference functions within the criteria, i.e. she states
whether all changes of the same amplitude are of the same importance, or
whether there are thresholds, etc. The impacts are then evaluated accordingly
on each criterion separately in comparison to the impacts of other options. (b)
The weights (or weight functions) of the different criteria are elicited from the
decision maker in order to calculate trade-off-functions for the evaluated
differences of the impacts in the criteria assessments. Due to thresholds,
incomparabilities of options may result. The decision maker may in the third
step of interpersonal aggregation use criterial preference functions, the weight
evaluations of the different criteria or the final rankings of other persons16
concerned by the decision. Dendograms, as developed by Munda (1995), might
help in the social decision making.
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Multi-criteria decision aid proposes structures to decision makers. These
structures are open to participation and may include scientific knowledge. They
propose an analytical approach to the problem (i.e., problem definition,
elaboration of a coherent family of criteria, designation of possible actions,
criterial evaluation of the actions, and aggregation of the evaluations).
Uncertainty and ignorance is relevant on each of these steps and it is possible
to include uncertainty explicitly. Common feature of all decision aid methods is
the assumption that the preferences are formed during the decision process.
The aim is not necessarily the choice of one option, but more generally the
elaboration of preferences, criteria, actions, and evaluations (Roy, 1996,  Roy
and Bouyssou, 1993). Such soft decision tools recognise ignorance as an
inherent property of the decision process.
The main difference in the aim of CBA and MCDA is that the latter wants to
compare different alternatives and not, as the former, identify the right value of
one measure. Comparing different measures to each other leads to the danger
that the ranking of the measures may change if one otherwise irrelevant
alternative is added or omitted (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986). This disadvantage
has to be balanced against the methodologically improper comparison of
different TEV’s (see above).
Multicriteria Analysis has, to my knowledge, not yet been applied to the problem
of biological invasions. How could this be done? The example of the invasion of
the brown tree snake (Boiga irregularis) in Guam, a pacific island belonging to
the US, shows different dimensions of effects of an invasion. Before the
invasion (probably through a military transport in the 1950’s), Guam had no
snakes and a rich endemic bird life. Now, 75% of the bird species have
disappeared along with lizards, bats, and other species (Jaffe, 1994, Rodda and
Fritts, 1992). These ecological effects are not the only impacts of the invasion:
There were losses in poultry farming, electricity cuts, and also endangerment of
human safety: babies and infants have been bitten while sleeping by the snake.
As the poison of Boiga irregularis is slightly narcotising, the children continue to
sleep. Snakes are even able to reach children sleeping in between their parents
                                                
13 The  methodological problem of interpersonal aggregation will  not be  discussed here. See on this:
Arrow, 1997; Sen, 1997.17
due to their sense of smell  (Kregel, 1999). This last impact also implies
changing of ways of behaviour and a sentiment of uncertainty and danger.
A narrow economic analysis would not make much sense here. Before
assessing the damage, it has to be clear why it should be done. Is it for limiting
the negative impacts of this invasion on Guam (1992, there were 12.000 snakes
per km
2 on Guam, cp. Rodda et al. 1992) or for making people choose the right
strategy against the invasion of Boiga irregularis on other tropical islands (the
snake already reached, for example, Hawaii and Saipan, cp. US OTA 1993)?
A Multicriteria analysis would, as a cost-benefit-analysis, first try to estimate all
ecological, social, and economic effects of an invasion, but would focus more
on non-economic data than a CBA. The criteria and the measuring rods are
elaborated during the concrete process, as well as the different policy options
which are evaluated. The evaluation is done in comparing each alternative
option against the others. The aim is not to find the efficient solution, but to
structure the reflection process, clarify the necessities and trade-offs, and to
make the decision process comprehensible.
How does multi criteria decision aid cope with the three dimensions of
uncertainty?
4.1 Factual uncertainty
There are different conceptions of integrating factual uncertainty in MCDA: it
may be integrated via a range of possible impacts, via a definition of a
probability function or via fuzzy sets. As the assessments are compared to each
other only in one criterion at a time, there is less danger of substituting different
factual uncertainties concerning ecological, social or economic criteria among
each other. There is no practice of conservative estimation – it is decided from
case to case how to consider extreme values. Some criteria may be assessed
by lay-persons, others by experts. The decision maker can interact with the
assessor and learn to understand the systems and processes to some extent.
The problem of missing knowledge about probabilities and extent of damages is
still existent, but it can be laid open. It is less the factual uncertainty itself that is
different from the handling in CBA than the handling of it in the social and value
discourse.18
4.2 Individual uncertainty
Due to this type of uncertainty, any assessment method must be open to
different ethical conceptions, be it a multi-dimensional view of the “good”, a way
to integrate non-persons, and to respect the right of future generations.
Any multi-dimensional conception of the “good” may be represented in MCDA
(cp. Funtowicz et al. 2002). Different methods of aggregation range from a
transformation into mono-dimensional evaluation to a simple identification of
dominating, dominated, and incomparable measures. It is up to the decision
maker to decide on the aggregation form which is a reversible decision.
Non-persons or future persons may be considered either by means of
advocates that weigh criteria for them or by means of special criteria. The latter
way is an explicit consideration via the moral reflections of the decision maker.
It is possible to include explicitly persons hypothetically representing future
generations in the decision team. Here, it is possible to guarantee a certain
standard of intergenerational equity in giving each of the concerned generations
the same weight. One has to take into account, though, that all dimensions of
uncertainty accrue when trying to represent future generations.
4.3 Social actor uncertainty
MCDA allows to address many critical questions explicitly, and to open them up
to a public discourse. This is especially valid for the question on who will
evaluate, and on which ways this will be done. Apart the openness to multi-
dimensional conceptions of the “good”, MCDA addresses most questions of
uncertainty by making them explicit. This assessment technique therefore is a
suitable basis for an open and fair discourse. In times of decisions about
complex issues with high levels of uncertainty, ignorance, and irreversibility, and
in complex societies with pluralistic moral convictions, the open and fair
discourse is the most convenient way to make acceptable and well-founded
decisions. MCDA can support many different forms of public discourse (see on
this Wittmer et al., 2003, Rauschmayer and Wittmer, 2003).
Main differences to CBA are the following:
•  Different forms of uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about the relative importance
of the different dimensions, uncertainty about the prognostics of the impacts,19
and uncertainty about the decision actors to be considered, can be taken
into account separately.
•  It gives the possibility to use explicit thresholds, partially due to irreversibility,
in distinct fields of impacts hereby reducing overall substitutability.
•  Such an approach needs less transformation of expert knowledge into
citizens’ values by avoiding overall monetarisation.
•  Finally, this decision aid process may be designed transparent for outsiders
and open to changes occurring during the process, hereby adapting to the
evolving needs of the decision actors. Changes might concern the impact
dimensions, the different alternatives, the participating decision actors and
the relevant alternatives for preventing or fighting the invasion.
5. Discussion
This chapter deals shortly with the four critical touchstones for choosing
assessment or evaluation techniques, herewith treating (1) a fact-related
question concerning the adequate representation of scientific and idiosyncratic
knowledge in the decision process, (2) a fundamental question concerning
ethics, (3) a methodological question concerning the right measure, and (4) a
practical question concerning the feasibility of the chosen assessment
technique.
•  Is the knowledge base reflected adequately by the assessment technique?
CBA allows to integrate the actual knowledge of every concerned person. Using
contingent valuation technique, this knowledge normally is enriched by
information chosen by the team responsible for the evaluation. There is a very
limited amount of information, normally at a very basic level that can be given to
the questioned people. Enlarging their information base and their knowledge of
the natural and social processes concerning an invasion is not really possible.
Using focus groups (cp.  Kontogianni et al., 2001) before the contingent
valuation may help the team to enrich their idiosyncratic knowledge base and to
include some of this information in the questionnaires, but normally no
exchange of arguments and time of reflection in order to evaluate better is
available to the questioned people. CBA must rely on three hopes: that the
team identified the relevant impacts, that they condense the relevant
information into the questionnaire, and that the questioned people believe the
information given to them.20
MCDA has to rely on the first hope, too. But the difference is that the team
normally comprises of experts, stakeholders, and lay-persons who debate in a
way structured by the multicriteria approach which should help to identify the
relevant impacts. As there is a constant exchange between the evaluators and
the team (who might be identical), it is assured to a high degree that the
relevant information and knowledge base enters the evaluation process.
Furthermore, as said before, factual uncertainties can better be identified and
integrated into a MCDA than into CBA.
•  Is the use of the technique consistent with the moral base of the society?
Each assessment of states or measures is reasonable if one knows the context
of the assessment. At first sight, this context often is rather technical. E.g., in
assessing an invading species, it makes only sense to determine the median
flowering time of the species if this time is an indicator for some processes that
influence for example the spread of the species (cp. Chittka and Schurkens,
2001). At second sight, and this becomes clearer in socio-economic
assessment, the context is normative. We assess the impact of an invasion on
agriculture because we think that such an impact (normally) is bad. Here, we
have an anthropocentric impact, but the ethical context of other measures in the
assessment might be biocentric, if we take the impact of an invasion on native
species without clear economic functions. It has to be clear that the technique
chosen is able to integrate all aspects that are judged relevant in the special
context: It is the context that determines the technique. If we evaluate measures
against invasions mainly in an economic environment where gains and losses
can easily be measured in monetary terms (e.g. in assessing impacts of an
invasion on agriculture), CBA may well represent the relevant normative
aspects concerning contemporary monetary gains and losses. If the invasion
concerns other aspects to a high extent, i.e. impacts on non-persons or future
generations, or impacts that are not easily measurable in monetary terms,
MCDA should prove to be the more appropriate assessment technique in
respect to the moral base (cp. Rauschmayer 2001).
•  Is the technique a useful base within the existent institutional conditions?
For reasons of practicality, assessment techniques have to be feasible. The
institutional context of the issues differ from one another: Which actors are21
concerned by a measure? Can they influence the impact of the measure? Do
they have additional knowledge? Does legitimacy or legality require that some
actors take part in the decision? Answers to these questions concern the
assessment techniques insofar as the technique chosen might have to be open
to participation and common decision making. Furthermore, assessments have
to be done in different depths: assessments in urgent issues must be done
rapidly, they have to be low cost, at least in a first stage. In a second stage,
when one knows already that there are high stakes, i.e. that the consequences
of the different measures might vary to a large extent, assessments may be
expensive. As stated above, MCDA is more open to an active participation of
actors than CBA. Furthermore, MCDA may be done on a very rough level and
on a very detailed level, just as appropriate. It is more difficult to do a CBA on a
rough level: Due to the principle of conservative evaluation, uncertain impacts
are left out, and these are – in a rough evaluation – mainly non-monetary
impacts (e.g. Pimentel et al., 2001). The resulting TEV is only a lower limit of
the impacts, but it is usually given in sharp numbers, making the illusion of a
detailed evaluation and not of a rough evaluation.
•  Are the yardsticks used a good measure of the overall aim?
The assessment technique has to make sense in the given context and it is
dependent on the aim of the assessment. At one side of the range is a mono-
dimensional situation where e.g. a farmer wants to maximise his medium-range
profit within the next 20 years. Here, everything can be calculated in monetary
terms, as it is only money that counts. On the other side, there is a situation
where many decision-makers with quite different ethical convictions want a
sustainable management of a forest in a long-term perspective. Here, money
counts, but also social cohesion of the forest users, soil quality, the self-
renewing capacity of the forest, biodiversity within (above and beneath) the
forest, etc. Here, it is hardly conceivable that one yardstick (monetary or any
other) would make sense. Calculating trade-offs between income, water quality,
and social cohesion would not make sense in such a context (Norton 2002).
Whereas CBA makes sense, when it is the aim to reach a good monetary
outcome for society or business, MCDA makes more sense in more complex
situations. The different yardsticks will be chosen appropriate to the different
criteria, and the aggregation of the different criteria (and potentially the different
evaluators) will be made explicitly. There is no generally best way to aggregate22
the different dimensions of the problem, and the context-dependent best way
can only be found within the context itself.
In conclusion, there are four advantages of Multicriteria decision aid to cost-
benefit-analysis as an integrated assessment of biological invasions:
1.  It reflects better the existing knowledge base.
2.  It allows a wider and more appropriate integration of moral points of view.
3.  It can better be included in social decision processes.
4.  It allows a better representation of the problem in most contexts.
The invasion of foreign species is a dynamic and specific process which is very
difficult to predict and which normally has irreversible impacts on many aspects
of human and non-human life.  Therefore, a socially embedded multicriteria
assessment is generally more appropriate than a cost-benefit-analysis. The
latter may only be used sensibly in very special cases.
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